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ABSTRACT 
In his 1986 White Paper on completing the single market, Lord Cockfield ailed mutual recog-
nition as the miracle formula for the much needed liberalization of services markets. Twenty 
years later, the European Union is passing a services directive where the principle of mutual 
recognition is conspicuously absent, at a time when effective liberalization seems ever more 
necessary. How do we explain this puzzle? Why has mutual recognition been put on “trial”? 
We make three interrelated arguments. First, the initial draft directive overlooked the EU’s 
prior experience in this area which is one of “managed” mutual recognition. Secondly, the 
political context had changed significantly, with enlargement exacerbating the distributional 
consequences of the adoption of mutual recognition. Thirdly, the final compromise succeeded 
precisely because it recovers the spirit of the managed mutual recognition, albeit in a mini-
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malist form. Nevertheless, final agreement has come at a price: the symbolic sacrifice of the 
principle of mutual recognition itself.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The trial of mutual recognition in the EU in the years 2004-2006 is a fascinating story, full of 
personal and political drama, false accusations and genuine resentment, aggressive grand-
standing and painstaking attempts at amicable settlement. The trial was run as much outside 
as inside the court room in Brussels, with crowds gathering in ever greater numbers to weigh 
on the final verdict. The trial meant different things to different people: a crucial test for the 
Commission’s liberal agenda as well as for the left’s “social Europe”; the promise of a better 
life for services workers from the East, the threat to a way of life for unions in the West.  
Crucially,  the  first  exhibit  in  the  trial  was  an  usurpation  of  identity:  mutual  recognition, 
stripped down to its bare bones, under the label of the “country-of-origin” principle. Para-
doxically, this principle would be the source of redemption for some, the source of all evils 
for others. Supporters of “country-of-origin” conjured up abstruse examples of hindrances to 
cross-border services deliveries. Are requirements of long cumbersome administrative proce-
dures in order, for example, to fix an elevator across borders proportionate to the task? Is it 
right to see the arrest of a Slovak tourist guide performing in Prague? By the same token, op-
ponents depicted doomsday scenarios where polish butchers and plumbers would be let loose   3 
in western European markets disregarding the social acquis of beleaguered trade unions with 
phantom firms escaping all regulatory control thanks to a letter-box in the East. 
Such polarization came as a surprise to the Commission for whom the application of mutual 
recognition to services had long been a technocratic tale of trial and error. While it had ap-
peared in the Treaty of Rome only with regards to the professions, Lord Cockfield had hailed 
mutual recognition in his 1986 White Paper as the miracle formula for the much needed liber-
alization of services markets across Europe. Twenty years later, however, such liberalization 
was still wanting even though it had become ever more crucial to foster economic growth in 
the ailing economies of the old Member states. 
This article analyzes the problems associated with integrating services markets via mutual 
recognition, with particular emphasis on the 2004-2006 negotiations concerning the horizon-
tal, non-sector specific services directive and its progressive evolution away from its original 
incarnation as the ‘Bolkenstein directive’. We make three interrelated arguments.  
First, we argue that in the initial phase of the debate, both sides mis-represented the EU’s 
prior experience in this area: the ardent proponents of the country-of-origin principle who 
argued that this had been the EU approach all along, and its ardent opponents who argued that 
it was completely new. By failing to admit that the EU had consistently practiced a form of 
“managed” mutual recognition in the past, in which home-country control is conditioned, par-
tial and monitored, the Commission and the Member States governments contributed to an   4 
extremely polarized situation in which agreement seemed impossible (Nicolaïdis 1993, 1996, 
2004). 
Second, we argue that the political context had changed significantly in the intervening years, 
with  the  politicization  of  the  single  market  and  the  greater  differences  between  Member 
states’ regulatory and economic development associated with Eastern enlargement. Fears of 
regulatory competition and social dumping in the richer Member states which had previously 
been invoked only to “manage” mutual recognition now led to a political veto. 
The emblematic figure of the “polish plumber” captures the challenge faced by the attempt to 
liberalize in such a context. Given the distributional consequences of the services directive, it 
was no surprise that unconditional mutual recognition proved unacceptable for many of the 
“old” Member states. While the discussion focused predominantly on economic gains and 
losses, behind these stood significant political repercussions for governments given the uncer-
tain implications of the directive for a variety of domestic regulatory bargains. We take the 
case of Germany to illustrate our argument. 
Thirdly, we analyze the final compromise and argue that it succeeded precisely because it 
recovers the spirit of managed mutual recognition. Nevertheless, the great irony is that it did 
so by eradicating mutual recognition altogether from the legislative text. By bringing host-
country jurisdiction back in – even if in a constrained form – the directive has understandably 
disappointed the most liberal constituency in the EU especially in the new Member states.    5 
In the following, we start with a discussion of the services freedom laid down in the Treaty, 
which the services directive aims to realize as well as a discussion of the contrast between 
trade in services and trade of goods. This is necessary as many of the confusions surrounding 
the services directive relate to it. 
SPECIFICS OF SERVICES TRADE, REGULATION AND LAW 
Mutual recognition as a means of creating a common market was recognized first for services 
in the Treaty of Rome where it was mentioned for professional services and the mutual rec-
ognition of diplomas. In spite of this, mutual recognition was only applied to a couple of pro-
fessions in the 1970s, on the basis of significant prior harmonization. And while the case law 
concerning judicial recognition of equivalence was developed with regard to goods (Dasson-
ville, Cassis), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) bulked when it came to apply it to services.  
Indeed, services are considered a “harder case” for liberalization than goods, not only because 
they are generally more regulated, but because of their mode of delivery which often involves 
the movement of either service providers or consumers across borders - unless the service is 
provided electronically. It is often said that services are intangible and invisible – recall the 
Economist’s famous definition that services are that which cannot fall on your foot. One im-
plication is that it can be difficult to separate their production from their consumption, in that 
value is produced for the consumer at the moment of interaction with the provider. We can 
draw an analytical distinction between the service delivery and the product itself in the same 
way as process and product standard are distinguished for goods. But for services almost all   6 
regulations have to do with processes, themselves bound up with home-country rules whether 
concerning market access (e.g. training requirements for ski instructors), operation (e.g. cer-
tain solvency requirements, speed limits), acceptable products (e.g. insurance types), and their 
distribution (cf. Roth 2002: 16). Thus, host countries usually need to apply their regulations to 
process standards if they want to affect the quality of the service; but the application of such 
rule may in turn impede delivery of the service altogether.  
This reasoning holds provided that free movement of services can be distinguished from free 
movement of labour or establishment since the latter two naturally call for host-country con-
trol. The core test here – as stated in the Treaties – is temporariness. If a cabinet-maker offers 
particularly tailored repair services across borders, she profits from the freedom of services, 
and at least theoretically, from home-country rule; if he does it on a continuous basis with 
some sort of establishment, it is the freedom of establishment that applies, and thus host-
country rule. According to this reasoning, workers posted temporarily would deliver services 
according to working conditions (pay, training) of their home countries, side-by-side with the 
very differently regulated workers of the host country. It is easy to see how such an inference 
could be resisted. 
Since the freedom of services targets temporary activities, it did require constraints on the 
application of host-country regulations to avoid a prohibitive burden, but it also generously 
provided for exceptions – allowing the host country to invoke the general interest and the 
likes in order to justify the application of its own rules (Hailbronner and Nachbaur 1992:   7 
112). As with goods, such allowance would of course be subject to the rule of reason (neces-
sity and proportionality test), but services restrictions always seemed to be based on good 
reason. When it came to labour standards, working conditions and pay, the court clearly al-
lowed  “the  general  interest”  to  justify  host  country  control  (Rush  Portuguesa  ruling,  C-
113/89).  
The question becomes therefore, to what extent is it desirable and feasible to move from a 
situation of constrained host-state jurisdiction as is currently the case for all services not cov-
ered by sector-specific directives, to a situation closer to mutual recognition as has been the 
case for trade in goods? Given the prevalence of process standards, it is no surprise that the 
prospect of generalized mutual recognition raised fears of uncontrolled regulatory arbitrage, 
even though regulatory competition and the downgrading of standards does not seem to occur 
in sectors where recognition has already been adopted.  
 
RECURRENT  PATTERN:  FROM  THE  1986  WHITE  PAPER  TO  THE  2006 
SERVICES DIRECTIVE 
At a time when the “new” character of the current services agenda has been stressed so relent-
lessly by the media, it seems fascinating to highlight the parallels between Frits Bolkestein 
and Lord Cockfield in their respective crusade on behalf of mutual recognition. One English, 
one Dutch, the two commissioners in charge of the single market were both outspoken liber-
als. Like Bolkenstein 20 years later, Cockfield took to its ultimate logic the single market im-  8 
perative. In his White Paper – endorsed by member states through Delors’ Single Act – he 
picked up on the approach worked out by the Commission since Cassis de Dijon, which was 
to generalize the philosophy of “recognition of equivalence” to the whole of services. But 
many services fell outside the net of the Single Act. 
Then and now: three interrelated logics  
By 2000, in spite of the dynamic set in motion by Delors and Cockfield, and while almost 
every type of services had been touched by one directive or another, the Commission contin-
ued to identify numerous barriers and even still nationality requirements. At the turn of the 
century, the single market was far from complete, calling – again! – for a more radical ap-
proach. The familiar pattern can be summed up as an interaction between three logics. 
First, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice which instead of an injunction to 
recognize, provided a “roadmap” for future legislation. The distinction made in the insurance 
directives between types of consumers that could or could not withstand the logic of mutual 
recognition or the 1996 directive on the posting of workers are prominent examples of politi-
cal translation of the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court might have become slightly bolder in 
the early 2000s than in the early 1980s – proportionality was to be taken seriously – but the 
same limitations applied (Hatzopoulos and Do 2006). 
The second logic is broadly integrationist, whereby, usually for exogenous reasons, Heads of 
States assert the teleological credo of the need to complete the single market, instructing the 
Commission to make it happen (demand side). As they had instructed Delors in 1984, they   9 
repeated more or less the same message at their 2000 meeting in Lisbon where they set out a 
strategy for 2010, to make the Union the most competitive region in the world. In both cases, 
completing the single market was at the core of the agenda. “In 2001 intra-EU exports of ser-
vices … only represented around 20% of trade in the Internal Market, compared with ser-
vices’ 53.6% share of GDP” (European Commission 2004: 9). The Commission (supply side) 
then takes the politicians at their word in fact “upping the ante” by proposing a radical gener-
alization of the Court’s approach in the pursuit of the completion of the single market for ser-
vices, which is after all what the political masters are asking for.  
But then, a third logic kicks in, the properly political process of bargaining, whereby a win-
ning coalition of member states succeeds in watering down the extent of transfer of sover-
eignty through recognition in order to make liberalization politically acceptable.  
The difference between the two period lies both in the salience of such political bargains and 
in the Commission’s capacity to anticipate them. While Bolkenstein sought to implement his 
“pure” philosophy directly through a single horizontal directive, Cockfield’s was spelled out 
separately in the 1986 White Paper and then translated through several dozen sectoral direc-
tives (including communication, transport, finance, and the professions) which did not simply 
enforce mutual recognition. Instead, they reflected subtle and complex bargains struck among 
regulators who sought to please their political masters by liberalizing for the headlines but 
complemented recognition with all sorts of caveats (Nicolaïdis 1993, 1996, 2004). Mutual 
recognition was managed to ensure that regulatory competition not lead to consumers’ confu-  10 
sion and a general downgrading of standards. Managed recognition involved minimum prior 
harmonization or convergence of standards as with goods, but also other attributes, like di-
minishing  the  automaticity  of  access  to  host-country  markets  by  granting  residual  host-
country control, reducing its scope in various ways and setting up mechanisms of ex-post 
guarantees and monitoring (indeed, such “tricks” to attenuate the import of mutual recogni-
tion had been used since the 1960s). In short, in 1986-1992, the monopoly of initiative of the 
Commission was not used to carry out the radical agenda as such but to fine-tune its limits. 
In contrast, oblivious to the political nature of services regulation even when responding to 
the mandate of politicians, the Prodi Commission refused to make concessions to political 
expediency. In December 2000 it proposed a comprehensive strategy to complete the single 
market, including seven new directives. Most importantly, DG single market was charged 
with drawing up an inventory of all remaining barriers to services, delivered in 2002 to the 
Council which then requested action. More than happy to oblige, Frits Bolkestein drafted the 
most radical directive ever to address the single market for services, in all those areas where 
specific measures have not yet been taken. Given that sector-specific attempts at building the 
single market for services had had their limitations, such a horizontal approach was in fact 
consensual across EU institutions and Member states. Bolkestein consulted with national min-
istries over a period of two years and national bureaucrats seemed to be more or less on his 
wavelength.    11 
So by early 2004 the draft “Bolkestein directive” was born. Little did its creator suspect that it 
would achieve such fame and disrepute. What was so different this time around? To what 
extent did the directive depart from the prior step-by-step logic of managed mutual recogni-
tion adopted earlier by the Commission?  
A bold directive 
To start with, the scope of the draft directive was extremely broad, targeting both the freedom 
of establishment and the freedom of services for those not previously covered by other direc-
tives. The directive exempted only lotteries for commercial services. Critically, the directive 
covered services of a general economic interest, including health and social services outside 
direct state provisions– while genuinely general interest services, which are delivered without 
any profit interest (e.g. education, cultural activities), were left out. 
Moreover, scope was also made ambiguous with regards to the relationship between the draft 
directive and existing European law for services, concerning financial services, utilities, ser-
vices of general economic interest, posted workers, professions. Neither did the draft apply to 
these sectors, nor did it exempt them; instead it “complements existing services laws”, leaving 
room for all sorts of forecasts concerning potential conflicts. 
Most importantly, the very core of the directive is the idea that the only way to remedy the 
petty bureaucratic impediments imposed by host countries is to make access to markets across 
borders as easy and automatic as possible, which in turn would require to fully enforce the 
principle of “country-of-origin” or home-country control. As a result, the host country would   12 
be restricted from enforcing its own laws or practices to justifications linked to “public order, 
public health, and public safety” - in other words narrowly defined public-interest rule which 
did not even encompass the ‘rule of reason exceptions’ recognized by the Court (Drijber 
2004: 3).  
Relatedly, the directive also tackled the issue of applicable contract law. Home-country rules 
were only relevant for business rather than consumers for whom international private law 
would stay applicable. Such introduction of home-country control without detailed specifica-
tions as to its scope and prior conditions led to much criticism as serious conflicts with Rome 
I and II was feared (Basedow 2004). 
To be fair, the directive did not call for jurisdiction of the country-of-origin across the board. 
Obviously, greater freedom of establishment will always allow for host-state territorial con-
trol; but at least, the directive required host states to create a one-stop-shop with exclusive 
administrative responsibility (Art. 6) in order to do away with restrictions on establishment 
which cannot be justified by the principle of proportionality.  
More to the point, the most controversial aspects of the directive had to do with the conditions 
under which workers providing cross-border services - such as butchers, plumbers or con-
struction workers  – would be treated. Theoretically, such movement  falls under the 1996 
posted-workers directive (96/71/EC) and its application of host labour law and wages. How-
ever, the draft foresaw the easing of some restrictions, like the need to carry papers for local 
controls in the host country and the obligation to appoint a national representative (Art. 24).   13 
Such  provisions  would make  it  more  difficult  for  host  countries  to  know  whether  posted 
workers complied with their legal provisions, thus bringing even the area of labour movement 
in the ambit of a recognition through the backdoor.  
Open questions related also to the precise definition of the temporary nature of service provi-
sion which determines in turn whether a worker is a service provider or a migrant. The direc-
tive left this open as it is difficult to set limits relevant across the board. For instance, seasonal 
services such as skiing instruction would need to be treated differently from other activities.
1 
Given the planned extent of pure recognition a precise definition of temporariness would have 
been key to preventing a situation of “anything goes.”  
Finally, while no concession was made to prior harmonization, the directive did include the 
obligation of national authorities to cooperate with each other, thus including ex-post safe-
guards. Thereby, since freedom of services often leads to situations where host countries have 
to verify the actual respect of home rule, the directive sought to improve their capacity to do 
so by requiring information from home-country authorities as to the legality of companies 
posting workers for instance. 
Perhaps such a sweeping horizontal directive targeting very different conditions in different 
services sectors was bound to be contentious in the traditional political economy of the EU 
where constituencies naturally resist reforms which may question their rents. However, to 
understand the unprecedented escalation observed in the resistance, we need to examine more   14 
closely the changing context and changing frames of liberalization in the late 1990s, early 
2000s. 
CHANGING CONTEXT AND CHANGING FRAMES FOR LIBERALIZATION 
There is little doubt that the EU’s biggest enlargement since its inception conditioned the re-
actions to the services proposal. Simply put, the level of differences in national regulatory and 
legal settings was simply becoming too great to sustain the permissive consensus on liberali-
zation that had (more or less) prevailed until then. The German case can help us understand 
how this general state of affairs translated into specific resistance to the directive. As the larg-
est Member state, neighbouring the new Member states, as well as plagued with high unem-
ployment, high wages but no minimum wage, Germany is bound to be a special target for 
low-cost services exports. Perhaps Germany could be considered an outlier. But while espe-
cially vulnerable, it was also a harbinger of things to come. 
Changed context: An influx of Eastern Europeans 
A few months after the 2004 enlargement, Germany was surprised by the extent to which East 
Europeans put pressure on its national job market. This came unexpectedly as it had joined 
most other Member states (with the exception of the UK, Ireland and Sweden) in using the 
transitory arrangement (2+3+2 years) restricting the freedom of labour for the new Member 
states (excluding Cyprus and Malta). In addition, Germany had negotiated a transitory regime 
for the freedom of services, exempting construction services, cleaning, and inner decoration. 
Arguably, these exemptions are precisely in those areas where East Europeans could profit   15 
least from existing wage differentials as construction is a sector where a minimum wage ap-
plies. In all other sectors, workers can come in temporarily under the services freedom – in-
terpreted by the German authorities as up to one year – and replace German workers for the 
wages of their home country, given that there is no general minimum wage (Christen 2004; 
Temming 2005).
  
As a result, enlargement has turned sways of public opinion against the existing freedom of 
services provisions. Germans have been laid off on a large scale from slaughterhouses bring-
ing in personnel “from the east” working for little money under deplorable conditions (in 
some cases, wages are only 2-3 Euro/h and daily working time is up to 16 hours). The respon-
sible trade union spoke of 26.000 lost jobs or one third of all employees in the sector being 
replaced by East Europeans.
2 The legal situation is complicated as East Europeans can come 
in under a combination of host and home provisions, to which illegal activities are added. 
Moreover, under the freedom of establishment, East Europeans with lower labour standards 
expectations face no restrictions. (FAZ 10.9.2005, p. 16). No wonder that the prospect of fur-
ther liberalization through the services directive was all but welcome (Hamburger Abendblatt 
26.2.2005, p. 23). 
To make matters worse, domestic reforms had increased Germany’s vulnerability with the 
significant liberalization in 2004 of the crafts law which made it easier to establish a company 
even with only one self-employed person. Until then, the 1953 crafts law restricted establish-
ment to individuals having a “Meisterbrief”, i.e. a master craftsman’s diploma involving ex-  16 
pensive and long-term training. East Europeans constituted the bulk of those taking advantage 
of the new law (265 out of 391 new tilers after the reform in Munich). This is not surprising 
since no specific wage and social security obligations exist for self-employed persons. At the 
same time, stories started to emerge of East European craftsmen getting around the require-
ment for a “permanent establishment with sufficient space” by sharing a single address, or 
illegally claiming establishment while exclusively or predominantly working for a single cus-
tomer (Stuttgarter Zeitung 12.4.2005, p. 1; General-Anzeiger 14.5.2005, p. 3). 
Short of establishment, the posted-workers directive prescribes German labour conditions for 
all branches. However, with no general minimum wage, there are no wage restrictions on 
posted workers. The posting company is only required by the law to discharge social security 
expenses and be active in the home country – a safeguard against mere “letter-box compa-
nies”. Moreover, posted workers cannot fully be integrated in the German company’s work 
process;  otherwise  social  security  would  have  to  be  paid  in  Germany  (Fleischwirtschaft 
12.5.2005, p. 10). 
Consequently, a host of opportunities arise for illegal activities: Are workers really tempo-
rary? What does it mean to apply the working conditions of the host country? What is a rea-
sonable pay when no host state minimum wage exists? Is the home company real and active 
or merely established for posting workers? What is the criterion – e.g. what percentage of 
company employers must actually work in Poland, representing what percentage of the annual 
turnover? And does the company really pay social security? How would the host country   17 
know? Can it trust controls carried on in the home country? Indeed if the home country itself 
suffers from high unemployment rates, what is its incentive for playing by the rules? 
Changing frames: Anti-globalization… Europe’s way 
By the time the services directive came to the attention of the European media, such prior 
questions had neither been resolved in Germany nor in the rest of Europe. With slow growth 
in Europe and the GDP share of services, the renewed attempt of the Commission to tackle 
services liberalization could have been seen as an imperative. Indeed, supporters of the draft 
directive easily produced numerous examples of abstruse hindrances to the services freedom, 
which were clear violations of Treaty obligations. But the arguments of their opponents were 
put in even starker terms. There seemed to be no meeting point between the two worldviews. 
To simplify, we could argue that two broad trends in Europe provided the backdrop for the 
mounting resistance against what came to be called the “Frankenstein directive”. The first was 
part  of  a  more  global  politicization  of  trade,  the  European  version  of  anti-  or  alter-
globalization, or the idea of Europeanization as globalization. The mobilization of fears in the 
broader public was based on the now familiar notion that these sources of comparative advan-
tage across countries are not all born equal and that to extend liberalization to countries with 
significantly lower GDP per capita allowed them to exploit “unfair” advantage. This move 
from free trade to “fair trade” reached a critical turning point with the 2005 bra war against 
Chinese import.   18 
This argument took on special force in the case of the services directive where instead of so-
cial dumping at a distance, we have what could be called face-to-face social dumping. Thus a 
principle that had been widely used in the EU to complete the single market – namely that of 
country-of-origin – now made a re-appearance on the European public sphere as the Trojan 
horse of “unfair competition” and “social dumping”, in a way that the public could indeed 
comprehend: people coming to work here will carry their home rule on their shoulders so to 
speak,  like  double  agents  operating  in  the  European  social  space.  Citizens  from  the  new 
members were not fellow Europeans but strangers within objectified as a group through the 
very real metaphor of the polish plumber (or butcher in Germany). – No matter that polish 
plumbers on the French soil were very few and far between. 
The case for the defense argued that social dumping should be no concern given that the post-
ing of workers directive largely prescribed host-country rules. But as the German case illus-
trates, the truth is more ambiguous as only minimum wages – but not collective wage agree-
ments – can be made mandatory. Like Germany, Scandinavian countries had come under 
pressure, as the ECJ does not treat minimum wages and collective agreements in the same 
way although they are institutional equivalents (Woolfson and Sommers 2006).  
The second general trend associated with the resistance to the draft directive and its core sus-
pect, the country-of-origin principle, has to do with ideologization. While there had been de-
bates for a long time about the liberal bias of the single market and the need for social flank-
ing measures, only in recent times has free trade come to be associated with deregulation and   19 
a “neo-liberal agenda”. It may be true that the prior phases of building the single market had 
demonstrated that liberalization most often went with re-regulation, but there is no denying 
that the draft directive was likely to have a significant deregulatory impact, as Commissioner 
Bolkestein himself stressed: 
“Some of the national restrictions are archaic, overly burdensome and break EU law. Those 
have simply got to go. A much longer list of differing national rules needs sweeping regula-
tory reform.”
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This kind of statement of course reinforced the social resistance to what was seen as the dis-
embeddedness of global markets. Opposition to the directive became a rallying cry for the 
left, for unions and groups like ATTAC. It was amply used in the French referendum cam-
paign to illustrate the drift to a neo-liberal Europe, regardless of the fact that the directive 
could be passed under the existing Treaties. In this ideological context, host-country rules 
were defended not as protectionist nor even as social protection for the workers of the West 
but as an extended hand to the workers of the East in a grand gesture of solidarity to guarantee 
better working conditions for them, too. The polish plumber should be denied home-country 
rule for his own good, as otherwise Poland would soon suffer from wage differentials with 
Ukrainia, a reason invoked by Solidarność to oppose the services directive. 
In other words, the opponents stressed the unique qualities of services trade and denied the 
analogy to goods. Services trade has to do with the movement of people they stressed. It is 
less objectionable to sell shoes in the same shop which were made under very different condi-  20 
tions in Europe and in East Asia, than to have service providers from different countries 
working alongside  each other  while subject to  different rules and pay. Whereas a person 
working in a shoe factory in the Far East can at least – however poorly – live from her wages 
there, posted workers delivering services on a temporary basis could not easily live where 
they worked under home-country wages (cf. Streeck 2000). 
Moreover, the old arguments against mutual recognition as a burden for consumers and not 
just as a guarantee of choice reappeared in this context. The legal certainty obtained for ser-
vices providers when operating under home-country rules would come at the cost of legal 
uncertainty for host-country consumers who might not be aware that a service was provided 
to them under an unfamiliar set of rules. The transaction costs of adapting to several legal 
systems would be shifted from service providers to the consumers. 
In sum, after the liberalization of the utilities and of financial markets as well as changes in 
corporate governance with the takeover directive, the services directive was perceived as the 
final  blow  to  the  European  social  model  and  the  advent  of  Anglo-Saxon  pure  capitalism 
(Höpner and Schäfer 2007). Much of the contention was caused by the uncertain implications 
of the directive. Would mutual recognition imply that a Dutch architect planning and building 
a house in Germany would do so according to Dutch building laws? Could a Polish cleaning 
woman working in Germany use detergents not certified on the German market (Hamburger 
Abendblatt 26.2.2005, p. 23)? Would a British bus driver working in Germany drive on the   21 
left? While the last question is obviously absurd, it illustrates a contrario the logic of the 
prosecution. 
In contrast, those on the defense side were at pains to stress analogies with goods and the long 
history of transferring mutual recognition from goods to services. The Commission’s impact 
assessment stressed the cost of non-“services Europe” in terms of growth and employment 
potential  and  reiterated  the  absurdity  of  the  barriers  targeted  by  the  directive  (European 
Commission 2004). Proponents referred to France where service workers from other Member 
states have to register eight days in advance, making it impossible to cross the border and to 
repair an elevator; to Belgium, where a painter has to transport his ladder in a special car, usu-
ally not owned by EU-foreigners; to southern European Member states where tourist guides 
have to take special training, making it difficult for tourist groups to enter with their own 
guide; or the need for service providers everywhere around Europe to present officially trans-
lated documents and certificates.  
Supporters moreover stressed that small and medium-sized enterprises suffer most from the 
status quo, while large companies could acquire the necessary legal assistance to adapt to 
host-country rules. And since cross-border services delivery was often a necessary first step 
for a cross-border establishment, allowing to test demand, such investment was impeded, too. 
Against the fears of social dumping, they argued that all would benefit in letting uncompeti-
tive services sectors disappear – especially low-cost services sectors in high-wage countries. 
Liberalization would ease the export of highly specialized services to Eastern members whose   22 
markets were growing fast. Moreover, the pressure on low-skill services jobs in countries like 
Germany was not due to European but to domestic political processes. Germany could affect 
face-to-face social dumping simply by opting for a minimum wage. But could it have its cake 
and eat it, too? No one seemed to complain about the meat companies from the Netherlands 
and Denmark relocating to Germany, in order to profit from East European wages.
4 
More generally, supporters responded to the views of Europeanization as globalization with a 
vision of Europeanization as “non discrimination”. They stressed the desirability of globaliza-
tion “with a human face” (even that of a polish plumber!), the desire of most human beings to 
return to “home sweet home” and the need to convey solidarity through open markets rather 
than harmonization. 
Supporters of the directive however failed to mobilize on a par with its opponents. While the 
unions mounted protest after protest, consumers or employers’ associations did not emphasize 
their interest in liberalization. In the Commission, the single market Commissioner McCreevy 
similarly opted for a low profile, leaving it largely to President Barroso to argue in favour of 
the directive. The centrality of the directive for the Lisbon-Agenda was thus not sufficiently 
underlined (FTD 17.2.2006, p. 29). Perhaps in any case, the directive in its original form was 
doomed once its opponents had successfully reframed the issues at stake. 
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NEGOTIATION AND COMPROMISE: MUTUAL RECOGNITION SACRIFICED 
Opposition against the directive mounted throughout 2004-2005, coinciding with the ratifica-
tion campaign for the constitutional Treaty. In view of the calls for “death to the services di-
rective”, it may seem like a miracle that the European Parliament managed to vote with an 
overwhelming majority for a revised draft, upon which the Council issued its common posi-
tion in July 2006. Indeed, for the first time so visibly in the context of the single market, the 
locus where political bargains had been struck had changed from the Council to the European 
Parliament. However, in order to reach compromise the letter, if not unambiguously the spirit 
of mutual recognition had been sacrificed.  
How did Member of European Parliament (MEP) Evelyn Gebhardt – a German social democ-
rat and rapporteur of the single-market committee – succeed? In a nutshell, through politiciza-
tion, or the self-conscious adaptation of a hitherto technical exercise to the new political con-
text in which it was taking place. In view of the contention surrounding the home-country 
principle, this meant finding a compromise between the two biggest political parties of the 
parliament, the European Socialists (PES) and the European People’s Party (EPP). At first, 
the compromise came in the form of a safety clause allowing Member states in certain cases 
not to apply the principle. But one week before the plenary vote, the European Parliament 
(EP) protagonists decided to abolish the home-country principle altogether. 
To be sure, Evelyn Gebhardt and her colleagues had tried for a while to replace the country-
of-origin principle with mutual recognition as the core principle for the directive. She was at   24 
pains to explain that the two had to be differentiated radically. Cassis, she stressed was also 
about allowing the host country to impose its own mandatory requirements. Mutual recogni-
tion was a conditional process and did not have the either-or character of the country-of-origin 
principle. In Drijber’s words: 
“Under the Court’s rulings, the law of the host state must be ‘disapplied’ to incoming services 
in so far as its application would give rise to an unjustified restriction of free trade. In other 
word, mutual recognition is a conditional obligation because the host state may always try to 
justify a restrictive means. By contrast, the country-of-origin principle works like a rule of 
conflict. It sets aside the law of the host state, including rules that are compatible with the 
Treaty. Mutual recognition becomes an unconditional obligation. The Directive therefore goes 
much further than the case law” (Drijber 2004: 3f.). 
Thus, by prescribing aloud home-country control, the draft had gone much beyond the ser-
vices freedom and its interpretation (Albath and Giesler 2006: 38f.; Schlichting and Spelten 
2005: 239). In contrast, mutual recognition as understood by Gebhardt was above all an on-
going process of political negotiations where the burden of proof would still be on the home 
state to show the equivalence of its rules. 
In other words, the contrast was one between the unconditional and systematic adoption of the 
country-of-origin principle on one hand and what we described above as managed mutual 
recognition on the other hand. Perhaps by insisting on the virtues of mutual recognition as 
opposed to the (unconditional) country-of-origin principle, the MEPs believed for a while that   25 
semantics matter and that the connotation of “recognition” would be more politically correct 
to the broader public. But given the extent of opposition, the term ‘mutual recognition’ could 
not be rescued. 
Instead, the final compromise of November 2006 (Directive 2006/123/EC), which built on the 
Parliament’s first reading of February and a Council compromise of May, refrained from 
moving beyond the jurisprudence of the Court. Depending on expectations, it can be read al-
ternatively as an insignificant gloss on the status-quo ante or as putting in place the first steps 
of a highly managed form of mutual recognition.  
Accordingly, where is the balance struck on automaticity of access? The compromise focuses 
on the obligation to enable the freedom of services through non-discrimination – a minimalist 
approach which of course in its extreme interpretation could eventually be regarded as an in-
junction of recognition. For now, the host country has to ensure that service providers have 
“free access to and free exercise of the service activity within its territory” (Art. 16) but it 
remains in control of what happens on its territory. For instance, recital 87 reads “this Direc-
tive should not affect the right for the Member state where the service is provided to deter-
mine the existence of an employment relationship and the distinction between self-employed 
persons  and  employed  persons,  including  “false  self-employed  persons””.  The  burden  of 
proof clearly stays in favour of host country rule. 
However, the move back to the host country’s jurisdiction is coupled with a long list of re-
strictions on the measures they can impose, which, in good ECJ parlance must be necessary   26 
and proportional. It is prohibited to request authorization, registration, identification or estab-
lishment as well as to prescribe certain materials and tools for service provision (Art. 16). 
And the socialists failed, to allow for host-state measures justified by “consumer interests and 
social policy reasons” (FTD 17.2.2006, p. 9). Under the “managed recognition” reading, the 
prohibition to impose these types of host-country rules does imply that home-country rules 
are valid in such cases, and that the directive helps authorities of both host and home coun-
tries to control enforcement of their own rules wherever the service provision takes place.  
As to applicable scope, the directive remains horizontal in nature. But Art. 2 excludes many 
of the services which were particularly contentious, such as all health services, public trans-
port, social, and security services, temporary work agencies, gambling and lotteries, postal 
services, electricity, gas, water, waste, audiovisual services, electronic communication, finan-
cial and legal services. Moreover, facilitations foreseen for the posted-workers directive were 
deleted. This was much against the interest of the East European Member states, who had felt 
discriminated  against  by  the  requirements  of  this  directive.  In  order,  to  compensate,  the 
Commission has started an assessment of the implementation of the directive in the Member 
states (FTD 9.2.2006, p. 9; 10.2.2006, p. 11). 
Moreover, the parliament introduced in the directive a call for the Commission to propose 
further harmonization measures. Other original provisions were kept, such as the requirement 
of host countries to create a one-stop shop to facilitate the freedom of establishment, the need   27 
to abolish rules implying disproportionate burdens, and the requirement of the home- and 
host-country authorities to improve cooperation and information flows.  
The House of Lords European Union Committee spoke in favour of the directive: 
“We are persuaded that the list of exclusions and derogations are less daunting than they 
might seem and that the revised draft Directive covers a substantial part of the services sector 
such that it can make a useful contribution to the growth of cross-border services provision 
within the EU” (House of Lords 2006: 19). 
The Commission had come to accept that the services market would have to be liberalized by 
less radical means and made clear that it would back a compromise rather than use its right to 
withdraw the proposal. Commissioner McCreevy also noted in this context that criticism of 
the compromise was hypocrisy given that the employers associations had hardly supported the 
directive when the unions mounted their protests (FAZ 22.2.2006, p. 12). In proposing small 
amendments, the Commission’s philosophy seemed to be to try to save whatever was possible 
from the spirit of recognition. It resisted the parliament’s attempt to get rid of the mutual 
evaluation scheme between regulators which would increase the scrutiny on host states seek-
ing to retain arbitrary measures. Hence the Commission used a communication published just 
before the passing of the Directive (“Guidance on the posting of workers in the framework of 
the provision of services”
5) to reintroduce two of the administrative means often used by host 
states and prohibited in the early draft under article 24 (obtaining an authorisation form, hav-
ing a representative in the territory of the host state). In terms of scope, it insisted on keeping   28 
notaries under the directive, at least for some of their activities – a classic disaggregation 
technique familiar to prior managed mutual recognition exercises. These were on the whole 
minor points, as the Commission ultimately rallied to the EP’s sacrifice of mutual recognition. 
The final version of the directive was adopted by the Council in December 2006 with absten-
tions from Lithuania and Belgium, thus avoiding a persistent conflict pitting new and (a ma-
jority of) old Member States. Such a conflict had seemed likely αfter Parliament’s first read-
ing, since many East European MEPs had voted against the initial compromise. Moreover, 
there had been rumors that their governments were trying to organize a blocking minority in 
the Council, encouraged by the fact that the UK, Spain, Poland, the Czech Republic, the 
Netherlands and Hungary had spoken out for a more liberal solution (FAZ 11.3.2006, p. 1, 
11).  
 
CONCLUSION 
If the recourse to mutual recognition has long been considered as a path of least resistance, 
“easier than harmonization,” we can no longer doubt its contentious character. While Euro-
pean integration is often criticized for taking place behind the back of the public, the court –
like drama which surrounded the infamous “Bolkestein directive” between 2004 and 2006 
demonstrates mutual recognition’s highly political nature, if at least occasionally. We made 
three interrelated arguments, on the radical strategies of the respective actors, the changing 
political context and the character of the final compromise. The first two concern the discon-  29 
nection between chosen institutional strategies and a changing political context which led to 
extreme polarization of the issue. With hindsight, we believe that the Commission made a 
political mistake in departing from its experience with managed mutual recognition and press-
ing for a rather radical form of recognition across the board. Given the lack of progress in the 
targeted sectors and the economic benefits at stake, such a change in strategy was understand-
able. But given the public unease surrounding both enlargement and globalization (or simply 
“competition”) the Commission might have anticipated resistance.  
The case for the defense is compelling. Services are indeed a challenging object of trade lib-
eralization, often involving as they do the movement of people as well as highly regulated 
sectors of the economy. Extraterritorial tensions are bound to accompany the kind of recogni-
tion necessary to ensure a market “without borders”: clients unfamiliar with the foreign rules 
governing their services providers; employees in the same workplace for companies regulated 
in different countries; authorities of the host country having to verify the application of home 
rules but constrained in doing so; host-country rules which still apply but need to be enforced 
by home-country authorities where companies are located. The original directive would have 
cut the Gordian knot. 
The last part of our argument has to do with the compromise that was finally struck in the fall 
of 2006. First and foremost, we must highlight a fundamental political shift, namely the new 
role of the EP is serving as the locus for such compromise-crafting politics. On the substance, 
we have shown how, unfortunately, the EP had to formally sacrifice mutual recognition at the   30 
altar of crude criticism which failed to understand that such recognition could be managed to 
address the extraterritorial tensions inherent in trade in services. To some extent, this mini-
malist result can be seen as the inevitable consequence of the trust dilemma associated with 
recognition (Nicolaïdis 2007). The compromise eases the fears stemming from lack of trust 
but its sustainability is predicated on some level of trust nevertheless. 
This dilemma in turn will affect the impact of the services directive. Many observers in the 
EU legal community believe that by emphasizing the rights of the host country, the directive 
falls behind the case law of the ECJ (Editorial Comments 2006). Others would say that by 
strictly circumscribing such rights, the directive will allow for a comprehensive assessment of 
all domestic rules concerning the access to, or exercise of services activities across the EU. In 
fact we argue, the actual impact of the directive on the ground will depend on three concurrent 
factors – for each trust plays a crucial role, whether between regulators, courts or indeed the 
citizens of Europe. 
First, it will depend on whether there will be a genuine commitment on the part of the regula-
tory authorities of member states – acting as host states – to refrain from exploiting their re-
maining authority under the directive and abide by the spirit of the “rule of reason”. This 
commitment in turn will depend on whether they learn to trust their home-state counterparts, 
whether “fraud stories” continue to make the headlines and whether labour-market pressures 
remain politically manageable.    31 
Second, there is no doubt that the directive leaves the door wide open for judicial activism on 
the part of the ECJ, an opening that can be used more or less wisely. Thus, the impact of the 
directive will depend on adequate enforcement of both host- and home-country obligations by 
the Commission and the Court, including soft enforcement through the mutual evaluation 
process. In doing so these actors need to engage with great political sensitivity with the de-
termination  of  which  host-states  requirements  are  legitimate  –  such  as  whether  collective 
agreements can be considered as functional equivalent to minimum wages.  
Finally, the fate of liberalization in the EU will depend on the evolution of the political cul-
ture of activists, unions and the broader public towards a greater understanding of the spirit of 
mutual recognition as a process of managing on-going differences and negotiating their toler-
able limit. Mutual recognition is a demanding form of transnational governance which seems 
more acceptable to states and their publics when they perceive it as a form of cooperation 
rather than competition (Nicolaïdis and Shaffer 2005; Schmidt 2007). And yet, if today’s 
challenge for Europeans is no longer just about the single market but also about the kind of 
political Union they want to share, the latter must build on the former and the link long estab-
lished in the Union – albeit still contested – between free movement, borderlessness, extrater-
ritorial law, trust and recognition. 
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